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ABSTRACT 
This paper proposes a non-neoclassical model of earnings 
and advancement over the working lifecycle. It assumes an economy 
that generates job-slots or positions, arranged institutionally 
at different seniority levels, each carrying a salary tagged to 
its level. The individual is driven upward in rank and salary 
as time passes, not because his productivity or human capital 
necessarily increases, but because retirement and death progres- 
sively thin out the numbers "above him" who occupy positions at 
higher levels. 
Larger labor cohorts (for example the 1980's "labor bulge") 
would depress age-earnings profiles within this system. The 
extent of earnings loss depends on the relative number of job- 
slots at different levels, on the age-location of these cohorts 
within the labor force, on the extent to which they bring into 
being new productive jobs, and on the promotional policy in force. 
AGE AND EARNINGS IN THE LABOR MARKET: 
IMPLICATIONS OF THE 1980's LABOR BULGE 
W.B. Arthur 
Current theories offer conflicting guidance on how demograph- 
ic changes in the labor force affect earnings and advancement over 
the working career. Human capital theory, as reflected in Welch 
(1978) for example, would predict that larger age-cohorts than 
normal would earn less throughout their careers. ' If, as human 
capital theory assumes, earnings are based on productivity, then 
the increased competition for complementary inputs must lower 
productivity and hence salaries. Members of larger labor cohorts 
will therefore have lower age-earnings profiles. 
Demographic theory on the other hand, if we extrapolate 
slightly the mobility models of Keyfitz (1973), would indicate 
a different result. Assuming earnings based on seniority or "rank", 
and "rank" in the labor force measured by relative position within 
the age-pyramid (the proportion above the age in question divided 
by that below) then the older members of a succession of large 
age-cohorts would be enhanced; they would gain in rank and hence 
in salary over their careers. The younger members, by the same 
token, would lose. Depending then on whether we see earnings tied 
to productivity or tied to demographic rank, larger labor cohorts 
 or other human capital writings on age-earnings see for 
example Becker (1 964) , Kreps (1 977) , Mincer (1971) , and Rosen (1 972) . 
might either impede or benefit their members over their careers. 
Cohort size, as a major influence on salary and career pro- 
gress, is a uuestion of some current importance. Most of the 
developed countries in recent years have witnessed much larger 
age groups than normal entering their labor forces: the post-war 
Baby Boom of the 1950s has grown up to become the "Labor Bulge" 
of the 1980s. Can we expect members of this Labor Bulge, young 
people now in their twenties and early thirties, to advance in 
salary and seniority at normal rates? Will they be speeded for- 
ward., or more likely, be held hack by their greater numbers? 
To answer this question, we must first construct a theory 
of how career advancement and salary vary with age. And for such 
a theory, neither the viewpoint of human capital, with its strong 
productivity-earnings assumption, nor that of demographic theory, 
with its peculiar definition of rank, is totally satisfactory. 
In most Labor markets these days, earnings are no longer tied 
directly to productivity. Soldiers, by and large, are not paid 
directly for wars won, nor are professors paid directly for know- 
ledge imparted. Instead, in most labor markets, people are paid 
simply for occupying their jobs. Whether they produce more or 
less makes little difference to their salary in the job they hold. 
Similarly, neither earnings nor seniority are tied directly to 
relative position within the age pyramid. Large numbers of young 
people could well be added to the civil service, for example, 
without necessarily affecting either the positions or salaries 
held by those higher up. 
This paper proposes a model of age and advancement based on 
assumptions different from those of both theories outlined above. 1 
In this model the economy generates large numbers of job-slots 
or positions, arranged for organizational reasons into various 
levels of seniority. Each position carries a salary, decided 
institutionally according to its level. The members of the labor 
force fill these positions and they progress not by learning to 
be more productive in the same job, but by advanding slowly through 
the hierarchy of positions according to their age and ability, 
'F'or a more detailed and less informal account of this model, 
treating other labor market issues, see Arthur (1980); and for an 
interesting application of this model to a single profession, the 
American academic profession, see Cornford (1979). 
occupying progressively more senior and more highly paid positions 
as those ahead of them thin out through retirement, early exit 
or death. Thus, in this model earnings are tied to positions, 
not to people, and seniority is measured directly by position held, 
not by demographic rank. Within this model we shall look first 
at how advancement varies with age, then at the effect of a labor 
bulge on the careers of its members. 
2. THE MODEL 
The labor economy considered here consists of four basic 
components: (i) a job seniority distribution, (ii) a wage func- 
tion, (iii) a labor-force age distribution, and (iv) a promotional 
system. 
(i) Job Seniority Distribution. The economy, it is assumed, 
generates job-slots or positions at various levels of 
seniority. Thus, at time t, there are m(s,t) positions 
at seniority level s. The seniority indicator, we assume, 
is well-defined (the U.S. government GS levels would be 
an example) and varies continuously between lowest levels -
and highest level s. The shape of this job-seniority dis- 
tribution, the actual number of slots at different levels 
in other words, is arbitrary and may change with time; 
it reflects the economy's organizational and institutional 
arrangements. Above level a there are 
positions. In total, at time t there are 
positions in the economy. 
(ii) Wage Function. To each position at seniority level s and 
time t is attached a wage w(s,t). The wage function w is 
largely arbitrary but given, decided by an political-insti- 
tutional process. We assume that w increases monotonically 
with seniority level st so that wage and seniority at any 
time are in one-to-one correspondence and can be used 
interchangeably. Together w and m are constrained so that 
the total waae hill equals non-invested total product F(t): 
(iii) Labor-Force Age Distribution. Occupying the positions 
generated by the economy is a labor force which has L(x,t) 
members aged x at time t. In total, at time t, there are 
members of the labor force, where w is retirement age. 
(iv) PromotionaZ System. We assume a promotional system P, de- 
termined by an arbitrary (and perhaps unconscious) social- 
institutional process. The promotional system tells us 
which of any two members of the labor force would be 
preferred, on the basis of age, education, background, sex, 
industriousness, or other labels and signals, if a position 
senior to both opened up. For simplicity we will condense 
the non-aqe factors into the general term "ability". 1 
In short, the promotional system establishes a preference 
ordering over the labor force, preference being determined 
on aqe and ability. 
To complete the model, we assume all positions are in prin- 
ciple open to all people, and that vacancies if they occur are 
filled immediately. We assume that if one person is preferred 
to another we find him in a higher job. And we assume at least 
as many people in the labor force at all times as jobs, so that 
- 
L(t) 2 M(t). The difference, L(t) - M(t) , corresponds to un- 
employment. 2 
'we can construe "ability" here as the general ability to 
satisfy the non-age requirements and preferences of the selection 
process. 
2 ~ f  the unemployed are to be paid an institutional wage, the 
model must be modified slightly. One possibility would be to de- 
clare the lowest seniority grade, - st to correspond to unemplcyment; 
(3) would then hold as before. 
To begin with we shall treat the four main components of this 
labor economy as causally independent and exogenously given. We 
can think of the economy's stock of capital and resources and its 
organizational habits as calling into being a necessary number 
and distribution of job-slots. This distribution changes over 
time, of course, as the economy grows or fluctuates. Population 
processes, separate from the economy, generate the labor force. 
The wage bill is constrained by total output, and its distribution 
is decided by a social or institutional process that attaches 
salary to the seniority or importance of each job. Finally, pro- 
motion follo~lrs trac7.itions of preference, and is uninfluenced by 
both the labor force and the economy. Later we shall look briefly 
at how the main components might to some degree influence each other. 
Our task is now to show how the job seniority distribution, 
the wage function, the labor force, and the promotional system 
come together to determine the paths of seniority and earnings 
over age, and how demographic changes in the labor force would 
alter this path. 
3. THE CAREER PATH 
Imagine the members of the labor force as scattered over 
an age-ability plane (see Figure I ) ,  each person located, at a 
Age 
Figure 1 
p a r t i c u l a r  t i m e ,  a t  t h e  p o i n t  t h a t  c o r r e s p o n d s  t o  h i s  a g e  and 
a b i l i t y .  Supposing t h e  p romot iona l  sys tem i s  r a t i o n a l  ( t h a t  i s ,  
i f  one  pe r son  i s  preferred t o  a  second,  and t h i s  second t o  a  
t h i r d ,  t h e n  t h e  f i r s t  i s  a l s o  preferred t o  t h e  t h i r d )  w e  can  re- 
p r e s e n t  it a s  a  series of  i n d i f f e r e n c e  c u r v e s  on t h e  a g e - a b i l i t y  
p l a n e .  For a  p a r t i c u l a r  p e r s o n  w i t h  a g e  a  and a b i l i t y  i, t h e  
a r e a  t o  t h e  " r i g h t "  of  t h e  i n d i f f e r e n c e  c u r v e  p a s s i n g  th rough  h i s  
l o c a t i o n ,  w e  w i l l  c a l l  h i s  region of preferment @ ( a , i ) .  The num- 
b e r  of p o i n t s  i n  t h i s  a r e a  t e l l s  u s  i n  t o t a l  how many p e o p l e  a r e  
preferred t o  him a t  t h a t  t i m e .  A s  t i m e  p a s s e s ,  a l l  p o i n t s  move 
un i fo rmly  t o  t h e  r i g h t - - e a c h  pe r son  a g e s  one y e a r  e v e r y  y e a r  -- 
w i t h  c e r t a i n  p o i n t s  d i s a p p e a r i n g  a s  peop le  re t i re ,  l e a v e  o r  d i e ,  
o t h e r s  newly a p p e a r i n g  a s  p e o p l e  e n t e r  t h e  l a b o r  f o r c e .  
To i l l u s t r a t e  some p o s s i b i l i t i e s  c o n s i d e r  p e o p l e  A ,  B, and 
C i n  F i g u r e  1 ,  each  w i t h  g i v e n  and unchanging a b i l i t y .  High a b i l -  
i t y  pe r son  A ,  under t h e  sys tem of  F i g u r e  1 ,  s t a r t s  o f f  s l i g h t l y  
p r e f e r r e d  t o  low a b i l i t y  p e r s o n  B. A s  t h e  y e a r s  p a s s  he  c r o s s e s  
t h e  i n d i f f e r e n c e  l i n e s  f a s t e r  t h a n  B t o  become y e t  more preferred: 
h i s  r e g i o n  o f  p r e f e r m e n t  r a p i d l y  s h r i n k s .  P e r s o n  C s t a r t s  o f f  
preferred t o  b o t h  A and B; he  remains  ahead of  B a t  a l l  t i m e s .  
But a s  t i m e  p a s s e s  he i s  bypassed by A. T i m e  and a g e  a l o n e  a l l o w  
A e v e n t u a l l y  t o  " l e a p f r o g "  C i n  t h e  p r e f e r e n c e  o r d e r i n g  f o r  h i g h e r  
jobs .  S i m i l a r l y ,  i f  w e  a l l o w  changes  i n  a b i l i t y  o v e r  t h e  l i f e  
c y c l e  f u r t h e r  l e a p f r o g g i n g  can  o c c u r .  
With in  t h i s  l a b o r  f o r c e  w e  now choose  a n  a r b i t r a r y  r e f e r e n c e  
p e r s o n  whose f o r t u n e s  w e  f o l l o w .  T h i s  r e f e r e n c e  p e r s o n  - - c a l l  
him person  R --was born  i n  y e a r  tRI i s  aged t - tR, h a s  a b i l i t y  
l e v e l  iR( t ) ,  and o c c u p i e s  s e n i o r i t y  l e v e l  a  i n  y e a r  t. The func-  
t i o n  a ( t - t R ) ,  R ' s  s e n i o r i t y  l e v e l  a s  it depends on h i s  a g e  - - h i s  
career path a s  w e  s h a l l  c a l l  it - - i s  what w e  seek  t o  d e t e r m i n e .  
A t  time t ,  under  t h e  g i v e n  p romot iona l  p o l i c y  P I  t h e r e  a r e  
N R ( t )  members of  t h e  l a b o r  f o r c e  preferred t o  p e r s o n  R. Where 
@ ( t  - tR, iR( t ) )  i s  R ' s  r e g i o n  o f  p r e f e r m e n t  a t  t i m e  t ,  t o t a l  num- 
b e r s  preferred t o  him a r e  g i v e n  by 
Now, these people, p r e f e r r e d  to 3, must occupy positions senior 
to his level a at time t, and we know that there are M(a,t) such 
positions above level a at that time. It now follows from our 
earlier assumptions, as a fundamental accounting identity, that 
the number of people above R equals the number of jobs above his 
level : 
Solution of this identity for a at each time t gives us the 
function a(t - tR), person R's career path. R's age-earnings 
profile follows immediately as the function w (a (t - tR) , t) . 
We may use the fundamental identity to plot person R's 
career path over time, for ease of illustration holding the job 
distribution fixed over time. 
Figure 2 
To construct R's career path in Figure 2 we begin with functions 
M(a) and NR(t), chosen arbitrarily. M, by definition, will de- 
crease as seniority level rises. NR, the numbers ahead of R, in 
the usual case will decrease with time. As R ages older cohorts 
retire in sequence from the labor force and other members, p r e -  
f e r r e d  to him, may leave early or die. Barring major shifts in 
ability between 3 and his rivals then, NR will decrease over tire. 
Given NR(t) and M(a) the career path may be plotted as the set 
of points where NR vertically equals M horizontally. Thus, as 
Figure 2 shows, the passage of time pushes the representative 
person upward in seniority by diminishing progressively those 
p r e f e r r e d  to him for positions in the hierarchy. In this way the 
aging of those in the labor force drives the dynamics of advance- 
ment, the actual path of the career depending on relative numbers 
in the labor force at different ages, the promotional policy in 
force, and the relative numbers of jobs at different levels. 
It is instructive to sketch the career path for a number of 
special cases: 
(i) For a high-ability person A, we can expect that NA(t), 
the number p r e f e r l q e d  to him, will fall rapidly. He will 
therefore reach the top rapidly as can be seen by plotting 
his career. Low ability person B, on the other hand, will 
rise only slowly, as numbers preferred to him dwindle (if 
at all) at a low rate. He will be condemned to low levels 
throughout his career; worse, if NB(t) should exceed the 
total availability of jobs, M(t), a possibility more 
likely while he is young, he will be forced downward from 
time to time into unemployment. 
(ii) For promotion based strictly on age alone, with older 
people preferred to younger so that the indifference 
curves are vertical, all career paths for members of a 
given cohort are identical. Each person, in this case, 
if he enters at the youngest age, must start at the bottom; 
and he must reach the top position just before retirement 
holding it briefly just as long as he is the oldest person 
in the labor force. The career path will be relatively 
steep. 
(iii) For promotion based strictly on ability alone, with the 
indifference curves now horizontal (imagine for example 
an entire economy consisting of nothing but Formula One 
Grand Prix racinq drivers), the career path of any given 
person will be flatter, fluctuating up and down as his 
ability changes and as the net number of more able workers 
varies with entries and exits from the labor force. 
(iv) For an expanding economy with job-slots increasing at all 
levels (am/at > O ) ,  all persons, regardless of ability, 
will advance more rapidly than otherwise. This can be 
seen by plotting the same NR time-curve against success- 
ively expanding job distributions. Conversely, if the 
job market is contracting at all levels, advancement will 
be less rapid for any given person; indeed his seniority 
and salary may well decline. 
4. EFFECTS OF A LABOR BULGE 
Loosely defined, a labor bulge is a succession of labor 
cohorts larger than normal. More precisely, we may assume some 
nominal "usual" size distribution for labor cohorts, the devia- 
tion from this (see Figure 3) being the labor bulge. 
Labor 
Cohor t  
D e n s i t y  
Age 
Figure 3 
Thus a labor bulge can be written as the differential function 
where LO is of course arbitrary. The question is now how much 
the presence of a labor bulge will affect both the career and 
salary paths of workers of different ages and with different 
abilities. 
At time t, the labor bulge will cause R's career path to 
change by 6a[t - tR] seniority units, and his salary by 6w(t - tR) 
monetary units. And since these depend on the particular function 
6L we write them in full as 6a [t - tR; 6L] and 6w[t - tR; 6L1 . Now, 
according to our earlier assumptions, the labor bulge cannot 
affect the distribution of work-places: m was given exogenously. 
(In the next section we will relax this, allowing additions to 
the labor force to cause the creation of new positions.) For 
the moment the labor bulge can affect only the numbers and place- 
ment of the labor force in the given array of positions. Accord- 
ingly, it will change the numbers preferred to person R at time t 
by an amount 
where the region of preferment $(t -tR,lR (t) ) is abbreviated for 
convenience to $. 
Writing the fundamental identity in implicit form 
we see that 6a must be such that it compensates for the change 
in NR, to preserve the identity at zero. Thus, taking differ- 
entials across (9) , 
and recalling that 
we therefore have the change in R's career path at age t - t R  as 
or, usincr (8) 
The change in the earnings profile follows simply as 
In words then, person R's loss in seniority equals the additional 
numbers preferred to him at time t divided by the job density 
at his level. To see why this should be so, imagine the job- 
slots generated by the economy as arranged on a large staircase. 
The width of the staircase at level a corresponds to the number 
of jobs m(a) at that level. The labor force fills this staircase 
in an order that follows from the promotional-preference system. 
Suppose now we add a labor bulge somewhere in the middle of the 
age distribution. From person R's viewpoint, an additional num- 
ber of people 6NR, preferred to him, have been added. And since 
they must be fitted into positions senior to him on the stairway 
they must displace an equal number of people (including himself) 
downward. The presence of the labor bulge will therefore dis- 
place R downward on the stairway by an amount equal to the addi- 
tional numbers preferred to him, divided by the width of the 
stair at R's level. His salary will be lower than otherwise by 
a corresponding amount. 
Not all members of the labor force are affected identically 
of course. What matters is how much a person's region of prefer- 
ment, $, at any time "captures" the labor bulge. Suppose, in an 
extreme case, promotion is based on aye alone. Those ahead of 
the bulge, older than it, under this system have none of the bulge 
preferred to them; their $-regions do not capture the function 6L. 
Hence t h e y  s u f f e r  no l o s s e s  from t h e  b u l g e .  Those behind it ,  on 
t h e  o t h e r  hand f e e l  i t s  f u l l  f o r c e .  A l l  members of  t h e  bu lge  a r e  
" p r e f e r r e d "  t o  them, a l l  a r e  o l d e r .  I f  w e  assume r e a l i s t i c a l l y  
t h a t  numbers o f  j o b - s l o t s  narrow a s  s e n i o r i t y  rises, t h e n  ( 1 2 )  
shows t h a t  t h e  l o s s  i n  s e n i o r i t y  i n c r e a s e s  a s  t h e  c a r e e r  pro-  
g r e s s e s ,  r e a c h i n g  a  peak j u s t  b e f o r e  t h e  o l d e r  members of t h e  
b u l g e  r e t i r e  o u t ,  and d i m i n i s h i n g  r a s i d l y  t o  z e r o  t h e r e a f t e r .  
Thus, under  pure-age  promotion', c a r e e r s  f o r  t h o s e  behind t h e  
b u l g e  a p p e a r  t o  s a g  p r o g r e s s i v e l y ,  showing a  r a p i d  s p u r t  toward 
t h e  end.  The s e v e r i t y  of  t h i s  "mid-career  c runch"  of  c o u r s e  
depends  on how f a r  behind t h e  b u l g e  one is.  Those j u s t  behind 
t h e  b u l g e  a r e  h i t  w o r s t  o v e r  t h e i r  c a r e e r s .  Those f o r t y  y e a r s  
o r  s o  behind on t h e  o t h e r  hand a r e  d i s p l a c e d  b u t  l i t t l e ,  and o n l y  
a t  t h e  beg inn ing  o f  t h e i r  c a r e e r s .  F i v e  y e a r s  o r  s o  i n t o  t h e i r  
c a r e e r s  t h e  b u l g e  b e g i n s  t o  r e t i r e  o u t .  Age l o c a t i o n  w i t h  re- 
s p e c t  t o  t h e  l a b o r  b u l g e  is  a l l - i m p o r t a n t .  
Now suppose ,  more r e a l i s t i c a l l y ,  t h a t  promotion i s  based on 
b o t h  a g e  and a b i l i t y .  The s i t u a t i o n  i n  t h i s  c a s e  i s  more compli- 
c a t e d .  Those ahead o f  t h e  b u l g e  i n  age  no l o n g e r  c o m p l e t e l y  
e s c a p e .  T h e i r  r e g i o n  o f  p r e f e r m e n t  may b e  invaded by members of  
t h e  b u l g e  younger t h a n  them b u t  n e v e r t h e l e s s  more a b l e .  The i n -  
t e g r a l  l i m i t s  d e f i n i n g  NR now c a p t u r e  some members o f  t h e  l a b o r  
bu lge .  Those ahead o f  t h e  b u l g e  i n  a g e  w i l l  t h e r e f o r e  b e  s l i g h t l y  
d e l a y e d  i n  r e a c h i n g  more s e n i o r  l e v e l s .  Converse ly ,  w i t h  promotion 
now based on a b i l i t y  a s  w e l l  a s  a g e ,  t h e r e  i s  some hope f o r  t h o s e  
who come behind t h e  b u l g e .  I f  t h e y  have  h i g h  a b i l i t y ,  t h e y  may 
r i s e  r a p i d l y  i n  p r e f e r m e n t ,  g r a d u a l l y  " l e a p f r o g g i n g "  t h e  main 
c o n c e n t r a t i o n  of t h e  b u l g e :  under  a g e - a b i l i t y  promotion t h e i r  ' 
l o s s  i n  s e n i o r i t y  and s a l a r y  w i l l  be less t h a n  under pure-age 
promotion.  
From t h e  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  t h e  l a s t  two p a r a g r a p h s  w e  can  con- 
c l u d e  t h a t  t h e  d e g r e e  of l o s s  caused  by t h e  p r e s e n c e  o f  l a r g e  
l a b o r  c o h o r t s  depends  v e r y  much on a g e - p o s i t i o n  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  
t h e s e  c o h o r t s ,  on t h e  shape  of  t h e  j o b - s e n i o r i t y  d i s t r i b u t i o n ,  
and on t h e  e x t e n t  t o  which p e o p l e  a r e  s e l e c t e d  and promoted f o r  
f a c t o r s  o t h e r  t h a n  age .  
5. EXTENSIONS OF THE MODEL 
So far we have looked at advancement and the effect of demo- 
graphic changes within a model whose main components are separate 
and largely independent. In practice of course, the labor force 
may be causally connected --perhaps strongly, perhaps weakly -- 
to the wage function, the job distribution may be linked to tne 
labor force, and so on. Tracing the precise effects of the many 
possible linkages, fully closing the model in other words, would 
require the addition of many furtb.er assumptions and macro-mech- 
anisms. This is a task that will not be attempted here. Instead, 
we will confine ourselves to some speculative remarks on what 
might happen if two of the more important linkages were built in. 
Suppose first that the labor force can influence the job 
distribution. Suppose in fact that the very presence of larger 
labor cohorts tends to bring new positions into being. One way 
this might happen is through a Say's Law type of process, where 
the "naked worker", not covered by one of the economy's ready- 
made job slots, by his presence in the market creates his own 
work. A freshly qualified lawyer for example may generate new 
cases, an additional police recruit may discover new crimes, with- 
out necessarily diminishing job positions for their colleagues. 
If this happens, the job distribution may widen partly to accom- 
modate larger labor cohorts. A second way a labor bulge may 
enlarge the job distribution is through the creation, by the 
government or by other bodies, of artificial positions --posts 
that do not add to social product--the motivation usually being 
the desire to ease the additional unemployment caused by the bulge. 
In both cases, we can say the labor bulge bL "creates" new 
positions 6m(s) at level s. Above level a therefore there are 
in total 
additional positions created. An argument similar to that of the 
previous section shows that person R's seniority loss at time t 
will now be 
- 
6N (t) - 6M(a,t) 
(1 5) 6a [t - t,] - - 
m(a,t) 
The seniority loss is smaller now because some of the additional 
numbers preferred to R are absorbed into newly created jobs above 
his level. In the case where each member of the bulge creates 
his own position, 6NR will equal 6MI and the seniority loss will 
be zero. Exact evaluation of (15) would require assumptions 
about the particular mechanism of job creation; without this we 
can say that seniority losses of the previous section are offset 
as in (15) by the degree to which additional jobs are created. 
What of salary losses? Here a further complication is added. 
The additional jobs 6M will create additional non-invested product 
6F, so that the entire wage function will be forced to change to 
preserve the social budget (3) : 
- - 
(76) 6F (t) = \ss~(s,t) 6m(s,t)ds + ~:6wls,t)m(~,tld~ . 
- - 
How much the wage function will change at a given level depends 
on how much the additional positions cover their cost (first two 
terms in (16)) and on how the additional product is distributed 
(third term). In the extreme case where the additional positions 
are totally artificial so that 6F is zero, the same product must 
be distributed over more jobs and real wages must fall for some 
if not all levels. This will happen either by institutional re- 
distribution, or, if money wages are maintained at their previous 
levels, by inflation. ~ h u s  R's salary at age t - t R  will be twice 
affected by the labor bulge: first in an amount corresponding to 
his loss in seniority, second in an amount corresponding to the 
adjustment of the real wage function. 
In sum, to the extent that the labor bulge does not create 
new positions it will cause both seniority loss and unemployment. 
And to the extent that the positions it does create are artificial, 
it will cause a shifting down of the real wage function, possibly 
in the form of inflation. We can therefore not escape the possi- 
bility that a large labor bulge such as the present one might 
cause at the same time both higher unemployment and higher inflation. 
As a second possible linkage, suppose that membership in 
the labor force is not exogenously given, but that the labor 
force is attracted into the market by the wages it can command. 
That is, 
where X is the probability of belonging to the labor force at 
0 
age x, given salary path w , and B(x,t) is the size of the sur- 
viving age cohort at age x. Under these conditions the larger 
the labor bulge the more it will depress salary paths, and so 
the more it will discourage membership in the labor market. 
Eventually an equilibrium will be reached between the size of 
the bulge and the wage losses it occasions. Knowing the labor- 
force age distribution at equilibrium, the theory would go through 
as before. 
As a final speculation, we may relax the assumption that 
everyone in the economy is eligible for every job --that there 
is only one industry, as it were. It will be useful here to 
distinguish two polar situations: an economy consisting entirely 
of open professions, and one consisting entirely of closed pro- 
fessions. We define an open profession to be one which anyone 
may join at any time and be placed according to age and overall 
personal ability. Post-office work or other civil service jobs 
miaht be good examples. A closed profession by contrast cannot be 
entered except at the start of one's career. The church, medicine, 
the officer corps in the military, and many closed-shop trades 
are examples. Most professions would lie in between. 
Where the economy consists solely of closed professions the 
analysis would apply as before, but separately this time for each 
trade. Each profession in the economy would have its own labor 
force and job supply, for our purposes acting as a miniature 
labor economy unto itself. Career and salary paths would then 
differ according to the fortunes of the industry in question and 
the ups and downs of its past intake of recruits. Losses caused 
by a labor bulge would depend on the share of the bulge admitted 
to the profession in question. By contrast, an economy with 
nothing but perfectly open professions, with workers changing 
trades at any sign of a wage differential, would behave as one 
large homogeneous industry. Providing we order jobs now by wage 
and not by seniority, salary paths for people of the same age 
and ability would then follow just as before. In a real economy, 
somewhere between these polar situations, we can expect career 
paths not to differ as much as they would in the closed case, 
nor yet to be identical for similar people as in the open case. 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we have put forward a model of the labor econ- 
omy and the individual's place in it. And we have looked at the 
effects of demographic changes in the labor force on the individ- 
ual's path of advancement and salary. Much of the usual picture 
of the economy, with its emphasis on production, capital-labor 
ratios, and the like has been deliberately kept in the background. 
Instead the key determinants of income over age here are the 
supply of a set of seniority-and-salary-tagged positions and the 
existence of a promotionally-ordered age-and-ability varying labor 
force to fill them. 
No apology is made for the fact that the outlook in this 
model is heavily institutional. It would be stretching reality 
to invent neoclassical mechanisms for the way society arranges 
its production into an organizational hierarchy, for the way it 
attaches salaries to levels of this hierarchy, and for the way 
it selects and promotes people to fill these levels. These days, 
by and large, industry, government and the service sector define 
and advertise job positions, they tag salaries to them, they 
select people to fill them, and they pay their employees usually 
not piece-by-piece, but by the week or month for the occupancy 
of their positions. This does not mean of course that individual 
productivity, initiative, and ability count for nothing. If 
productivity is rewarded in the promotional system an individual 
may advance rapidly, certainly without it he may not occupy his 
position for long. 
Above all, what places this model outside the neoclassical 
framework is the fact that salary is not determined by any 
marginal-value analysis, but instead by an accounting identity 
that states that the jobs "above" any person must be filled by 
and be equal to the number of people "preferred" to that person. 
On the way each side of this identity might change over time hangs 
both the fate of the individual and the implications of the labor 
bulge. 
Different as its assumptions are, the model does contain 
overtones of both the human capital and demographic themes. Even 
if the worker is not paid his marginal product, the fact that the 
job-slot covering him determines his salary is close to the human- 
capital viewpoint that the capital covering him (plus his own 
experience) determines his salary. The difference is, and this 
should be emphasized, the present model need assume no learning 
nor indeed any such concept as "human capital" to explain the 
fact that salaries usually rise as the career progresses. What 
fuels the individual's career, what drives him upward in salary, 
is the fact that as time passes he grows older, and as he grows 
older the numbers "preferred" to him thin out through death and 
retirement. As time passes he has fewer and fewer rivals for 
positions in the hierarchy; he occupies higher positions and these 
are better paid. Here we have echoes of the demographic hierarchy 
theory, but with one important difference: position in the age 
pyramid is only half of what determines seniority; how the pyra- 
mid itself is fitted into the seniority distribution of jobs is 
the other half. Por the individual the distribution of jobs above 
him, their numbers, their level and their salary, is just as 
crucial to his career prospects as the number of people or the 
proportion of people above him. 
Finally, it must be said that the model put forward here and 
sketched out fairly roughly, would more suitably form the core 
of a larger model in which the four independent components are 
linked together in various ways. What is surprising though is 
that a simple model with few components --a job distribution, a 
labor age distribution, a promotional system, and a wage function -- 
can go far to describe what our career experience over our working 
lives might have to do not just with age and ability, but with 
the vagaries of promotional policy, the expansion and contraction 
of the economy, and the ups and downs of the changing age dis- 
tribution of the labor force. 
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